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Structural Estimation of Labor Adjustment Costs with Temporally
Disaggregated Data and Gross Employment Flows
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Abstract
Estimating labor adjustment costs is plagued by a variety of errors, many arising from data limita-
tions. Most researchers have assumed that adjustment decisions are made at the firm level, that adjust-
ment happens at the frequency at which a firm is observed (typically annually or quarterly), and that
adjustment costs are incurred on net changes in employment. In this paper, I estimate a dynamic opti-
mization model of labor adjustment of establishments based on data that permit 1) specifying any desired
adjustment frequency, 2) estimating the model based on net and on gross employment flows and 3) al-
lowing for simultaneous hirings and separations. The unit of observation is an establishment. Results for
adjustment costs depend crucially on the model specification. Only a monthly adjustment model yields
cost parameters in a reasonable range, while estimates from quarterly and annual adjustment models
imply negative (adjustment implies a gain rather than a loss) or excessive adjustment costs. Estimating
the model on net employment changes implies hiring and separation costs of around four annual median
salaries, while the model on gross changes implies costs on the order of 1.7 annual median salaries. Ad-
justment costs differ significantly between small and large establishments. However, a dynamic model
performs only marginally better than a static model with respect to out-of-sample predictions.
JEL classification: C25; D22; J23
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1 Introduction
Estimating the magnitude and structure of labor adjustment costs has a long tradition in economics and
has faced a number of challenges.1 Two main approaches can be distinguished. The more straightforward
approach is to use firm and establishment surveys on the costs of vacancy posting, training, redundancy
payments etc. and relating those costs to the number of hires and separations (as in Abowd and Kramarz
(2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010)). This information might not always be available, or the costs
reported by firms might not fully account for the loss of profits due to disruptions in the production process.
For those reasons most contributions to this literature analyze models of profit-maximizing firms and conduct
a structural estimation where the cost parameters are treated as estimable. The parameter values are chosen
(estimated) to reproduce certain observed data moments and statistics or employment trajectories of the
firms as closely as possible.
The structural approach suffers from a number of misspecification problems. In this paper I focus on
two of them. One is the question of the frequency at which firms revise their employment decisions. Here,
data availability dictates what the researcher assumes. Since employment data has usually come from firm
and establishment surveys, researchers have only known stocks of employment at fixed time intervals (e.g.
at the start of every quarter), and had to assume that firms make hiring and separation decisions at the
same frequency as the data was available. But the choice of adjustment frequency is not innocuous for the
estimation. A firm is more likely to change its employment in the long run. Thus, an infrequently observed
firm is likely to exhibit no or few inactive periods, suggesting that adjustment costs are (marginally) small.
Using higher-frequency data (quarters), Varejão and Portugal (2007) conclude that “micro and quarterly
(or more frequent) data are essential for studying the dynamics of factor adjustment because aggregation
(spatial or temporal) smoothes away any nonlinearities present at the plant or firm levels.” Bloom (2009)
also reports a high sensitivity of adjustment cost estimates to adjustment frequency. The issue of temporal
aggregation is also identified in Addison et al. (2014) as a major outstanding issue in labor demand research.
A more conceptual problem with the structural approach is to estimate costs based on net worker flows.
This necessarily follows from assuming that labor is homogenous. If all workers are the same, then why
would a firm decide to hire and fire simultaneously? Yet, the phenomenon of churning - the turnover of
1I examine labor adjustment, but the problems associated with estimating capital (or any factor) adjustment costs are almost
identical. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) is an excellent survey for the literature until 1996 and addresses all of the points discussed
in this paper.
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workers over and above job creations or destructions - is pervasive, even within narrowly defined classes
of employees (Abowd et al. (1999) and Burgess et al. (2001)). Structural models accommodate churning
through worker-initiated separations, but that still underestimates - perhaps substantially - employment ad-
justments initiated by the firm. Here, too, the modelling choices matter for the estimation. By using only
net flows, the researcher is measuring the main choice variable of the model with error.
In this paper I address the problem of temporal aggregation by using continuous employment data,
including all in- and outflows of employees, from a linked employer-employee dataset. I estimate my
model at different adjustment frequencies and compare the resulting cost estimates. I also use gross instead
of net adjustments and rationalize this choice by developing a model of dynamic discrete choice which
accommodates the simultaneous hiring of and separating from workers as an establishment’s choice. To
my knowledge, there is no other model of adjustment costs that does this. I show that these choices -
temporal frequency, net or gross adjustment - have substantial effects on the resulting cost estimates. The
limitation of this paper is that I do not offer a set of “correct” cost estimates. Developing a convincing test
for discriminating between the myriad of cost estimates that we have based on modelling choices remains
an open and very challenging question.
I build a model of linear hiring and separation costs which accommodates churning, the observation
of simultaneous hirings and separations, and estimate it for different aggregation levels, and separately for
adjustment costs defined over gross versus net flows. I show that the most important factor contributing
to higher adjustment cost estimates are the number of observations of inactivity. The economically most
sensible estimates of adjustment costs are obtained for a model of 1) monthly adjustment on 2) gross em-
ployee flows and figure around 35,000 Euros per hire and per separation. Without an external source on the
magnitude of adjustment costs there is nothing to compare these estimates against.2
Despite the above mentioned difficulties economists should be interested in estimating adjustment costs.
Macroeconomists will be interested in the effect of adjustment costs on unemployment and the labor market
effects of the business cycle; see, for example Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993). Policymakers will be interested in the role of adjustment costs when considering labor market inter-
ventions such as wage subsidies in a recession (such as the German Kurzarbeit program), and economists
2Unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly, estimates in the literature have a very wide range. For Germany, Mühlemann and Pfeifer
(2013) report hiring costs between 4,000 and 6,000 Euros per hire. However, Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) cite some accounting
studies which find adjustment costs of one year of payroll costs for the average worker. More on this in the discussion section.
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working in industrial organization should know the right specification of a firm’s objective function for pur-
poses such as estimating a production function. Labor economists are, I presume, intrinsically interested.
2 Literature
The literature on labor adjustment costs can be categorized on a number of dimensions. The first is the
choice of the unit that makes hiring and separation decisions (“spatial” aggregation). Hamermesh (1989)
shows that at the plant level long spells of inactivity are followed by lumpy labor adjustment – indicating
either the presence of fixed costs of adjustment or non-differentiability at a net adjustment of zero; see, for
example, Abel and Eberly (1994). Aggregated to the firm level, labor adjustment appears to be much more
frequent and smooth, suggesting a convex adjustment cost function. Researchers who have been interested
in the adjustment costs per se, rather than using them as a device for a better model fit, have employed plant
or firm-level data over higher aggregates ever since.
Second, a similar problem occurs with “temporal” aggregation. A plant or firm is more likely to change
its employment in the long run. Thus, an infrequently observed plant is likely to exhibit no or few inactive
periods with the same implications for cost estimates as in the spatial aggregation case, as demonstrated by
Varejão and Portugal (2007) who use quarterly data. Bloom (2009) highlights the same point. His model is
simulated on monthly adjustment frequency and aggregated to annual measures to match them with annual
data. He shows that cost estimates are lower if annual adjustment frequencies are assumed. It is interesting
to note that this point is often not even discussed in the literature and that there is not a consensus. For
example, using annual industry-level data, Hall (2004) argues that “both time aggregation and aggregation
across firms is probably not an important source of bias in estimation”. He finds no evidence for labor
adjustment costs: For 10 out of 18 industries the adjustment cost parameter carries the “wrong” sign.
Third is the correct specification of the cost function. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) reject the hypothesis
of convex adjustment costs in favor of other types of costs such as fixed costs, linear costs, and production
disruption costs.3
Forth is whether to use net or gross employment flows. When only the stock of employment at fixed
3One or several of those components are used by Abel and Eberly (1994); Abowd and Kramarz (2003); Aguirregabiria and
Alonso-Borrego (2014); Asphjell et al. (2014); Bentolila and Bertola (1990); Bloom (2009); Cooper et al. (2015); Ejarque and
Portugal (2007); Lapatinas (2009); Pfann and Palm (1993); Nilsen et al. (2007); Rota (2004); and Varejão and Portugal (2007).
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intervals is reported, then net flows must be used by necessity. If adjustment costs are costs of hiring and
separations rather than of job creation and destruction, then gross flows should be used as in Abowd and
Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010). Abowd et al. (1999) and Burgess et al. (2001) show that
net and gross flows differ considerably within an establishment, even within a skill group.
Fifth is labor heterogeneity which is closely related to the previous point. All structural estimations of
adjustment costs specify a production function with one type of labor without acknowledging that in such a
framework it makes no sense for an establishment to hire and fire within a period. Thus, adjustment costs
in such a model can only be incurred over net changes. Goolsbee and Gross (2000) illustrate how this
heterogeneity aggregation impacts on estimates of capital adjustment costs.
Sixth, a choice must be made concerning whether adjustment costs should be estimated using reported
costs by firms and establishments or using a structural model. If the objective is to quantify adjustment costs,
then the former is preferable and is done by Abowd and Kramarz (2003) as well as Kramarz and Michaud
(2010). Still, not all costs might be captured by establishment reports. In that case, or if interest lies in
comparing models with and without adjustment costs, or in counter-factual policy evaluations, structural
estimation is the method of choice, which in turn necessitates another set of modelling choices. Should one
use a partial equilibrium or a general equilibrium model? What is the production function? What process
determines wages? What data moments should be matched? And what should be the test to discard one type
of model in favor of another?
Table 1 gives a summary of the more recent literature on labor adjustment costs. The table is not ex-
haustive, and I chose the list of studies with an eye to the wide variety of modelling choices that characterize
the literature. Comparing results across studies is difficult because the adjustment cost function and other
modelling choices vary widely across the studies, but the results testify to the wide range of estimates that
have been found. Some of those studies focused only on the demand side of the labor market, whereas
others employ a general equilibrium (search and matching) model. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) is the only
study based on reported costs, and there is a wide spectrum of estimation methods, though most use a MSM
estimator. Interestingly, these are the same studies which find very low - often economically insignificant -
estimates of labor adjustment costs.
Here I want to stress that apart from this paper there are two studies which use gross worker flows,
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of which one is not a structural estimation (Abowd and Kramarz (2003)), and the other assumes no firing
costs and is in continuous time such that hirings along with firings can in principal occur over a given time
period (Trapeznikova (2017)). In contrast, simultaneous hiring and firing can occur in my model because
an establishment might wish to replace unproductive workers. My model is to my knowledge the only
one which develops a heterogeneous worker framework to rationalize simultaneous hiring and separation
decisions.
With respect to adjustment frequency, Bloom (2009) and Cooper et al. (2007) use a model with monthly
adjustment, but their data require them to aggregate the simulated choices either temporally and/or across
establishments to match aggregate data moments. I in contrast use observed monthly adjustments at the
establishment level to estimate labor adjustment costs.
3 Institutional Background
The OECD (1999) characterizes Germany’s labor market in the 1990s as one of the more regulated labor
markets of the OECD countries. Major reforms to reduce unemployment were initiated in the first half of
the 2000s, but these are not relevant to my sample period. The OECD (1999) lists the following institutional
and/or legislative features related to employment protection for Germany:
1. If a firm wishes to dismiss an employee, written notice has to be given to the employee and - where
applicable - to the workers’ council. If an employee is dismissed against the objection of the workers’
council, the case escalates to a labor court and the dismissal does not become effective until a decision
is reached.
2. Required notice periods can range from 2 weeks to 7 months, depending on the employee’s tenure.
There is no legal severance pay entitlement, but these can be stipulated in collective agreements. For
a worker with 20 years tenure, the severance pay for unfair dismissal is 18 months of wages.
3. For a dismissal to be classified as “fair”, a firm must make sure that an employee cannot be retained
in another capacity within the same establishment or enterprise, and “social” considerations must be
taken into account (e.g. age and number of dependants).
7
There are two more distinct features of the German labor market which contribute to labor adjustment costs.
First is the strong involvement of establishments in the training of young workers. Harhoff and Kane (1997)
estimate training costs to be between $5,000 and $10,000 in 1990 values. Second is the existence of workers’
councils at many establishments which need to be informed and consulted for certain decisions, including re-
structuring of employment and recruitment, and enjoy certain co-determination rights for procedures related
to dismissals as describe above (see also Addison et al. (2001)).
Another important difference between the German and the American labor market is that the latter is
much more dynamic. Bachmann (2005) report a job-to-job transition rate for the period 1980 to 2000 of
0.82% in Germany, compared to around 2.5% in the USA (Nagypál (2008) and Fallick and Fleischman
(2004)). However, movements into and out of unemployment are equally much lower in Germany than in
the USA. Jung and Kuhn (2014) report employment to unemployment flows of 0.5% (2.0%) for Germany
(USA) and employment to employment flows of 0.9% (2.6%).
4 Model
The main challenge in setting up an estimable model which allows simultaneous hiring and establishment-
initiated separations is to allow for worker heterogeneity such that only observable characteristics of the
workforce (e.g. the number of employees) enter the model as variables, while the unobservable parts (e.g.
the probability distribution of productivity among employees) enter as “errors”: factors which are considered
by the establishment, but not observable to the researcher. Vectors (and sets) are denoted in bold characters.
Establishments are assumed infinitely-lived, maximizing the present value of current and all expected
future profits, and being price takers in product and factor markets. In the German context the exogeneity
of wages is partly defensible due to the large coverage of workers by collective agreements, mainly at the
industry level. In 2000, 63% of workers in West and 45% of workers in East Germany fell under the coverage
of a collective agreement (Kohaut and Schnabel (2003)), even though the agreed wages are only binding as
a wage floor. Jung and Schnabel (2011) find that in 2006, 40% of German establishments pay wages above
the agreed level. An indirect piece of evidence for wage rigidities in Germany is Glitz (2012) who finds
effects of immigration on native unemployment, but not on wages.
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Workers are heterogeneous in their productivity. I use the term productivity in a broad sense. Any factor
which increases the marginal revenue of labor (e.g. a price increase in the product market) is an increase in
productivity. The vector of worker productivities at the end of period t− 1 is denoted ât−1. At the start of
period t, before any hiring or separation decisions are made, each worker receives a productivity shock εat ,
some workers might quit (ηqt ), while workers who were temporarily absent might return to the establishment
(ηrt , henceforth recalls). The productivity vector just before employment decisions are made is thus given
by:4
at =
(
(ât−1 + εat )\η
q
t
)
∪ηrt (1)
The number of workers changes according to
`t = ˆ̀t−1 +ηt (2)
where η is the number of recalls minus the number of quits. After observing at the establishment chooses
which workers to separate from, and how many workers to hire. I assume that the establishment observes
the quality of its existing workers but it cannot observe the quality of a worker it hires. However, it has an
expectation over the productivity of a hire which can differ across firms and time. If the firm decides to
separate from workers, then it will do so from the ones with the smallest marginal productivities. The state
vector of the firm thus consists of the productivity vector at , the expected productivity of new hires E(aht ),
and the wage wt . The productivity vector after the choices are made is given by
ât = (at \ ft)∪ht
where f is the set of productivities of the workers the establishment separates from, and h are the pro-
ductivities of the new hires. The resulting level of employment is:
ˆ̀t = `t − ft +ht
4The notation is abusive. I am combining a vector addition + with set operations \ and ∪.
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Sales are a (non-injective) function of the productivity vector: St = fs(ât). The vectors at and ât can be
fully characterized by their lengths, `t , and ˆ̀t , and the probability distribution of the productivities, which
I denote µt(a) and µt(â). The typical model found in the literature can be regarded as a special case, with
µt(a) being a degenerate distribution, and sales being simply a function of number of employees, and a
scalar productivity measure. We can characterize the state vector before employment decisions are made by
xt = (µt(a), `t ,E(aht ),wt)
The establishment observes at and ât , but the researcher only observes `t and ˆ̀t . Through equation 1, I can
further characterize µt(a) as a vector function of µt−1(â), ˆ̀t−1, εat , η
q
t , and ηrt . And since
St−1 = fs(ât−1)
= fs(µt−1(â), ˆ̀t−1)
I can write µt−1(â) as a vector function of St−1, ˆ̀t−1, and an unobservable component ε
µ
t−1. The latter
has to be included since, given ˆ̀t−1, different productivity distributions µt−1(â) can result in the same value
of sales. While knowledge of St−1 and ˆ̀t−1 does not uniquely identify µt−1(â), knowledge of St−1, ˆ̀t−1, and
ε
µ
t−1 does. Finally, I also have to consider that η
q
t and ηrt are not observed, but the net change of employment,
ηt , is, and I denote the missing information that maps ηt to η
q
t and ηrt by ε
η
t .
I can now characterize the state vector in terms of the observable variables St−1, ˆ̀t−1, η, wt , and the
unobservable variables E(aht ),ε
a
t , ε
µ
t−1, and ε
η
t . I further use equation 2 to reduce the observables to xot =
(St−1, `t ,wt), and collect all unobserved components in xut = (E(aht ),εat ,ε
µ
t−1,ε
η
t ). The entire state vector is
denoted by xt = (xot ,xut ).
4.1 Example
Before proceeding to the dynamic optimization problem it will be helpful to collect ideas by ways of a simple
example. An establishment with two employees with productivities a1 and a2 has to maximize expected
current profits. The wage is
√
5/8, both hiring and separations cost 0.1, and the expected productivity E(a)
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Table 2: Expected profits for different scenarios and choices
Scenario (1) (2) (3) (4)
A = 1.2 A = 1.2 A = 0.8 A = 1.5
a = {4,6} a = {3,7} a = {4,6} a = {4,6}
Inactive 2.21 2.21 0.95 3.16
Hiring 2.18 2.18 0.63 3.34
Separation 2.05 2.28 1.07 2.78
Hiring and separation 2.20 2.38 0.87 3.19
Note: Expected profits under four different scenarios. Hiring refers to hiring one worker,
separation refers to separating from the least productive worker. The wage is set to
√
5/8.
E(a) of a new hire is set to 5. The expected profit is given by equation 3. The best choice
for each scenario is highlighted in bold and yellow.
of a new hire is 5. The profit function is given by
π = A×
√
N
∑
i=1
ai−wN−0.1 f −0.1h (3)
where N is the number of workers. Table 2 shows profits of each choice (hiring one worker, separat-
ing from one worker, both, or none) under different scenarios for A, a1, and a2. The optimal decision is
highlighted.
The table shows how each of the four discrete choices (being inactive, hiring one worker, separating
from one worker, and replacing the least productive worker with a new hire) can be optimal under different
scenarios. When establishment productivity is high (low) under scenario 4 (3), the establishment expands
(contracts). A simultaneous hiring and separation occurs when one worker’s productivity drops below a
certain level to make it worthwhile to replace him, as in scenario 2. Note that the revenue of the establishment
under scenarios 1 and 2 before any adjustment decisions are made are the same. Only the spread of worker
productivities under scenario 2 is wider. In the model this difference would be absorbed in the term εµ, which
are characteristics of the distribution of worker productivities which are not observed by the researcher.
4.2 Dynamic discrete choice model
The establishment’s choice problem is the following:
V (xt) = max
ht≥0, ft≥0
π
e(xt ,ht , ft)−C(ht , ft)+βExt+1|xt ,ht , ftV (xt+1) (4)
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where πe is the expected profit function, and ht and ft are the (non-negative) number of hires and separations
chosen by the firm. The next period is discounted at rate β, and C is the adjustment cost function. Expec-
tations are taken over the future state conditional on the current state and decisions. The current profits are
expected, as the firm only has an expectation over the quality of its new hires.
If the profit function and adjustment cost function were differentiable everywhere, then it would be
easy to derive an Euler equation and to estimate the adjustment cost parameters with generalized method
of moments. Evidence against an everywhere differentiable cost function is quite strong; see, for example,
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). Employment changes are relatively rare, and tend to be lumpy when they
do occur, suggesting the presence of either fixed costs or non-differentiability at the point of no adjustment.
Moreover, at least for small establishments, assuming a continuously adjustable level of employment is also
problematic, in particular if the empirical model is set up in a way that non-activity translates into higher
adjustment cost estimates, thus confounding adjustment costs with indivisibilities of labor.5 I model the
adjustment cost function to be linear in hires and separations, thus introducing a non-differentiability at zero
adjustment and consequently a range for the state space that will make inactivity the optimal choice of an
establishment as in Abel and Eberly (1994). An Euler equation approach with non-differentiability is still
possible as demonstrated in Aguirregabiria (1997) and Cooper et al. (2010), though the requirements for
consistent estimation of this Euler equation are unlikely to be met. The main problem is the endogeneity of
the moment of adjustment; see Aguirregabiria (1997) for a detailed exposition.
Following the steps in Aguirregabiria (1999), the decision space of the firm can be split up into four
discrete areas: Let H be the discrete choice of h > 0 and f = 0, F the choice of h = 0 and f > 0, P
(for put) the choice of h = 0 and f = 0, and B (for both) the choice of h > 0 and f > 0. Denote the
choice set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive choices by D = {H,F,P,B}. Let d be the discrete choice
of an establishment: d ∈ D. With each of these choices, there is an associated optimal level of hires and
separations. For example, for d = H, we would constrain f = 0, but h would be the solution to the problem
V H(xt) = max
ht>0
π
e(xt,ht , ft = 0)−C(ht , ft = 0)+βExt+1|xt,ht , ft=0V (xt+1)
Let δd(xt) =
[
hd(xt), f d(xt)
]
denote the solutions for h and f in the discrete regime d. For a current choice
5This point is also made in Lapatinas (2009) who models the choice of employees as a discrete choice.
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d, next period’s value function itself can be split into the four discrete choices so that
Ext+1|xt,dtV (xt+1) = E
[
max
j∈D
(
V j(xt+1)
)
|xt,dt
]
The “discrete” version of the establishment’s problem in equation 4 is thus given by
V (xt) = max
dt∈D
π
e(xt,δd(xt))−C(δd(xt))+βE
[
max
j∈D
(
V j(xt+1)
)
|xt,dt
]
and the solution to this problem is denoted d∗t (xt).
To summarize, the establishment considers a discrete action (and the associated optimal h and f ). In
doing so, it forms expectations of the future state given its current state and this discrete action. It knows
that in the next period it will again choose among the best of the four discrete options (and the associated
optimal h and f ).
4.3 Empirical model
Following again Aguirregabiria (1999) I decompose each component which involves x as the sum of an
empirical counterpart which can be constructed from observable state variables and a term capturing the
deviation of the individual establishment’s expectation from this empirical counterpart. I model
π
e
[
xt ,δd(xt)
]
= E
[
π
d(xot )
]
+ud,πt (5)
where the first term is the expected profit under discrete choice d among establishments with observed state
variables xot , and u
d,π
t captures the deviation of the individual establishment’s expectation from the empirical
average. If the average profit expectations are equal to average profits, then E
(
ud,πt |xot
)
= 0, which is what I
assume. On average, establishments cannot be too optimistic or too pessimistic (though of course any single
establishment can). Equation 5 describes the transition from theory to data, and it is important to stress that
the left-hand side are expected profits from the perspective of the establishment, but the expectation operator
on the right hand side refers to the empirical expectation of profits of firms with the same characteristics.
Accordingly, the unobserved components of the establishment’s state, xut , are conceptually different from
the empirical error ud,πt . The ensuing estimation does not estimate any technological parameters relating
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to the profit function. But I am not interested in those parameters. This simplification comes at a cost.
Some assumptions have to be made regarding ud,πt (see below), and those assumptions might or might not
be defensible. More specifically, the assumptions would hold for some profit functions, and not for others.
I decompose adjustment costs as
C
[
δ
d(xt)
]
=E
[
Cd(xot )
]
+ud,Ct
=τ+E(ht |xot ,dt)+ τ−E( ft |xot ,dt)+u
d,C
t
so the adjustment costs are based on the average adjustments under the choice d and an unobservable
component ud,Ct . The current period profits net of adjustment costs for discrete choice d are thus
π
e
[
xt ,δd(xt)
]
−C
[
δ
d(xt)
]
=E [S(xot )]−wtE( ˆ̀t)− τ+E(ht |xot ,dt)− τ−E( ft |xot ,dt)+u
d,π
t +u
d,C
t
=z(xot ,dt)θ
′
z +u
d
t
where z(xot ,dt) = (E [S(xot )] wtE( ˆ̀t) E(ht |xot ,dt) E( ft |xot ,dt)), θz = (1 − 1 − τ+ − τ−)
and udt = u
d,π
t +u
d,C
t .
With xot containing three components, and having one udt for each of the four discrete choices, this
is a formidable problem to solve. Rust (1987) shows that under some assumptions the dimensionality of
this problem can be greatly reduced by eliminating the udt from the state space. The following standard
assumptions need to be made:
1. The shocks udt are independent across alternatives, across time, and follow an extreme value type I
distribution.
2. The distribution of the future observable state variables is independent of udt conditional on the current
state variables and the discrete choice, that is F(xot+1|dt ,xot ,ut) = F(xot+1|dt ,xot ).
In the appendix I show how this formulation results in a probabilistic formulation of the four discrete
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choice options, and four estimable parameters: σs, a metric of the measurement error in establishment
sales; σ, the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution; τ+ and τ−, the marginal costs of hiring and
separations. The estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood and is discussed below.
4.4 Discussion
The model developed in the previous section has important advantages over the class of models used in the
literature. Most importantly, it can account for churning as an active choice of an establishment. Churning
can also occur in models with (random) worker-initiated separations as in Bachmann et al. (2017), but in
the context of adjustment costs the exact reason for churning is important if the cost of worker-initiated
separations is different from the cost of establishment-initiated separations.
Second, the moments approach based on aggregate data moments suffers from a problem akin to what
Berry et al. (1995) call an “embarrassing ‘over fitting’ problem on aggregate data”. Suppose we have two es-
tablishments with the same past and current revenue, the same beginning-of-period employment, and facing
the same wage. In all structural models that I am aware of the labor adjustments of those two establishments
MUST have been the same, since the revenues and employment determine fully the technology variable
of the model (e.g. TFP), even if the technology variable is establishment-specific. Clearly, this imposes a
large degree of - counterfactual - establishment homogeneity. In my sample, looking at observations which
fall into the central six percentiles on each dimension of xot , 50 out of 80 observations are inactive, but the
remaining observations show hiring of up to four and separations of up to seven workers, and all remaining
discrete choices (hiring, separating, and both) can be observed. The dynamic discrete choice model allows
me in a simple way to account for different choices of establishments which are otherwise the same on
all observable dimensions. Unlike the alternative model discussed below, the establishment’s choice in the
dynamic discrete choice model is not determined by the observables.
Third, the model is more parsimonious than other models used in the literature. Since the interest is in
estimating labor adjustment costs, the model does not specify a production function, and has only a handful
of parameters that need to be estimated.
Another advantage is that the model lends itself to estimation based on every establishment’s adjustment
choices rather than picking a number of aggregate statistics to match. Much more information enters the
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estimation than in a simulated method of moments approach. It also “relieves” the researcher from having
to choose which particular moments to match.
The costs of the dynamic discrete choice model are mirror images of its advantages. The two assump-
tions on the error term are crucial, and especially the independence over time is unlikely to hold. Many
aspects of the labor market (the production function, evolution of technological parameters, wage deter-
mination) are unspecified and result in a loss of theoretical holism and appeal. We remain agnostic about
what would happen should some of those technological parameters change. Those are short-comings, and I
acknowledge them as such. But there are some mitigating factors. The independence of the error terms is
conditional on the observable state variables, and since the evolution of those state variables conditional on
the choice is embedded in the estimation, the independence assumption might not be too restrictive. While
I assume that establishments take wages as given, the establishment forms expectations on future wages
conditional on current state variables (including the current wage). In general, the evolution of the state
variables are all conditional on current state variables and choices, lending a lot of empirical realism to the
estimation.
Finally, I would caution against the thought that a fully specified model would yield more credible labor
adjustment cost estimates. Each degree of realism entails choosing one specification out of many. The
multitude of adjustment cost estimates testifies to the fact that these choices are all but innocuous.
5 Estimation
The estimation proceeds in three steps. I provide detailed information on the estimation in the appendix.
First, I need to obtain estimates of the state transition probabilities F(xot |xot−1,dt−1) and of the choice prob-
abilities P(dt |xot ). Second, I solve for the unique fixed point of W which is a function of F(xot |xot−1,dt−1),
P(dt |xot ) and z(xot ,dt) (see appendix). Third, I maximize the likelihood function based on the choice proba-
bilities for the discrete choices, where the choice probabilities are functions of z(xot ,dt),
θ̃z = (1/(σsσ) − 1/σ − τ+/σ − τ−/σ), and W. Here the parameter vector θ̃z is distinct from θ
because of measurement error in sales (see section 7.1) and because the scale parameter σ of udt can be
estimated and does not have to be normalized (see appendix A).
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In the data, I observe sales, employment, wages paid to every worker, the number of hires and the number
of separations. I assume every worker at any point of time is paid the same wage within an establishment,
which I take to be the median wage in the establishment rather than the mean due to some right-censoring
issues of the wage data. I discretize the state space into an array of ωw×ωS×ω` points, where I choose
ωw = 15 for the wage, ωS = 20 for sales, and ω` = 40 for employment, creating thus an array of 12,000
points. I choose the cell boundaries for w and S to have an equal number of observations in each cell. For `,
I choose a fine discretization for small `, and wider intervals for higher levels of employment. For each of
these points and each discrete choice, I calculate P(dt |xot ) by a nearest-neighbor estimator. In particular, I
first normalize the state vector (w,S, `) to a mean of zero and an identity variance matrix. Call the normalized
data (w̄, S̄, ¯̀) and the normalized state point x̄ot . For each normalized x̄ot , I calculate the Euclidean distance of
this point from the normalized data observations, and choose the k observations with the smallest distance.
The relative frequencies of the discrete choices among those k observations are used as estimates for P. I
follow Pagan and Ullah (1999) in choosing k =
√
n. The transition probability array F(xot |xot−1,dt−1) is
estimated in the same vein, but only among observations with the discrete choice of interest. To economise
on computation time, and in line with my assumption that wages are exogenous to the establishment, I split
the estimation of F(xot |xot−1,dt−1) into F(wt |xot−1,dt−1) and F((St , `t)|xot−1,dt−1).
The components of the vector z(xo,d) are also estimated by a nearest-neighbor algorithm. I estimate
E(S|xo,d), E(`|xo,d), E(h|xo,d), and E( f |xo,d) as the average sales, average employment, average hires
and average separations among the k observations with discrete choice d and the smallest distance to the
normalized state point x̄o.
Having all these objects in place, I start with an initial guess for the vector W(xot+1), to iterate on
equation 11 until convergence is achieved. I calculate the choice probabilities and the likelihood function.
The likelihood function is maximized by choice of θ̃. The costs of hiring and separating from one worker
are given by τ+ and τ−. The parameter σ is the scale parameter of the type I extreme value distribution, and
determines the variance of the distribution as π
2
6 σ
2. It gives a measure of how variant the distribution needs
to be to account for the hiring and separation heterogeneity of otherwise similar establishments and/or to
account for the choice of d of an establishment which based on its choice specific value functions should
have chosen a different alternative. The stronger the model is in predicting the observed choices of the
sample establishments, the smaller this variance should be. It is thus maybe comparable in spirit to the
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mean squared error in a linear regression model.
The reader might have noticed a certain inconsistency in parametrically estimating choice probabilities
(call them P2) relying on the non-parametrically estimated initial choice probabilities (P1). I follow the
methodology in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) who show that P itself is a fixed point in the sense that
iterating on P will lead to a unique solution of the recursive function of P. Thus, I use P2 based on the
estimated parameters θ̃, to feed them into a renewed computation of W. Then this W is used to obtain
P3, and the procedure can be repeated any number of times or until convergence in the parameter vector is
achieved. In the estimations this was roughly the case after four iterations.
Given that the final likelihood maximization uses many constructed variables based on a state-space
discretization and non-parametric estimation, I do not calculate standard errors of the estimates. Depending
on the exact specification, obtaining one set of results on a high-performance computer using 20 nodes takes
a few hours. Bootstrapping the standard errors with 500 replications would take me a few weeks. Instead of
calculating standard errors, I evaluate the performance of my model by out-of-sample predictions.
5.1 Identification
The likelihood function I am maximizing is the likelihood function of a multinomial logit model, and has a
unique maximizer, so the model is identified in that sense. In this subsection I am interested in the intuition
of what will determine sign and magnitude of the structural coefficients. I estimate the parameters of this
model freely. The data can invalidate this model in a variety of ways. In particular, common sense would
require 1/(σsσ)> 0, −1/σ < 0, −τ+ < 0, and−τ− < 0. That is, sales increase the value of a firm, the scale
parameter is positive, paying wages decreases the value of the firm, and labor adjustment is indeed costly.6
What do the data need to be like to yield these signs? The intuition can be captured – and the exposition
simplified – if in this section we ignore the continuation value part of the value function and focus on only
one variable. The likelihood of choosing the observed choice c out of a set D in a multinomial logit model
6To borrow from Tolstoy, there is only one way in which the model can be “correct”, but many ways for it to be “wrong”.
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is
P(d∗ = c) =
exp(xcβ)
∑a∈D exp(xaβ)
=
1
1+∑a6=c exp((xa− xc)β)
If β is positive, the likelihood function will increase each time that xa− xc < 0. Thus, if the coefficient on
sales is to be positive, the sales value among the chosen alternative needs to exceed the sales value among
the non-chosen alternatives sufficiently frequently. In general, the chosen option should dominate the non-
chosen alternatives with respect to sales. The reverse is required for the coefficient on the wage bill. Ceteris
paribus the wage bill paid under the chosen option needs to be lower than the wage bill under the non-chosen
options sufficiently often to guarantee a negative sign on the associated parameter.
Now consider the hiring cost parameter. Note that the estimated parameter is −τ+/σ. For the choices
H, B, F , and P, the variable values for xa are respectively
E(ht |xot ,dt = H)
E(ht |xot ,dt = B)
0
0
If the chosen alternative is P, then (xa− xc) for a ∈ {H,B,F} is
E(ht |xot ,dt = H)−0 > 0
E(ht |xot ,dt = B)−0 > 0
0−0 = 0
Since (xa− xc) is greater than 0 in two, and equal to 0 in one case, the likelihood function will be
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decreasing in the estimated parameter −τ+/σ, or, given σ > 0, increasing in τ+. That is, an inactive firm
will contribute to a higher hiring cost parameter. If we only observed establishments which do not adjust,
then τ+ would go towards infinity in an estimation. This agrees with our economic intuition. If we never
observed establishments which adjust their employment up or down (or both), then we would conclude that
it must be prohibitively costly for them to do so. Similar arguments can be made for the remaining discrete
choices.
This has clear implications for the problem of aggregation. First consider time aggregation. The shorter
the intervals at which firms are assumed to revise their employment, the more likely they are to be inactive.
Any hiring or separation during a month will also be a hiring or separation during the year, but a hiring or
separation during the year could still mean eleven months of inactivity compared to one month of activity.
As for size aggregation, a firm with thousands of employees is much more likely to be active than a small
establishment. Treating the large firm as one entity – with one decision maker for hires and separations
– and observing this entity constantly in employment adjustments should lead us to infer that hiring and
separating cannot be too costly, at least for small adjustments.
I estimate the model at three different adjustment frequencies: monthly, quarterly, and annual.
6 Alternative model
In addition to my benchmark model, I estimate a model which is more similar to the models in the labor
adjustment cost literature. I follow closely the exposition in Cooper et al. (2007).7 Estimating this model
serves the purposes of comparing it to the benchmark model (the estimation builds on the same data), and
to what extent temporal aggregation is a problem that extends to other classes of models.
The profit function of an establishment is given by
πt = At`αt −wt`t − τ+1(∆`t > 0)∆`t + τ−1(∆`t < 0)∆`t
where A is a technology parameter, 1(·) is the indicator function, and ∆`t = `t − ˆ̀t is the establishment-
7Their paper is interested in explaining the correlations between hours, employment, vacancies and unemployment. Since I am
interested in labor adjustment costs based on a labor demand model, I differ from Cooper et al. (2007) in the choice of moments to
match.
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initiated labor adjustment. Wages and A are exogenous, but follow a known stochastic process. Specifically,
lnAt = cA +ρA lnAt−1 +uA,t (6)
where uA,t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2A. Furthermore
ln(At/wt) = cw +ρw ln(At−1/wt−1)+uw,t (7)
where uw,t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2w. I model the process of (At/wt) rather than
only wt because more productive establishments pay higher wages.8 The dynamic optimization problem of
the establishment is
V (At ,(At/wt), ˆ̀t) = max
`t
πt +βE(V (At+1,(At+1/wt+1), ˆ̀t+1|At ,(At/wt), `t)
where ˆ̀t+1 = `t +ηt , and ηt are net worker-initiated quits and recalls which happen at the end of the period
after production has taken place. The establishment thus chooses its employment, and therefore only its net
adjustment, but it might enter the succeeding period with a different number of employees due to quits and
recalls (thus, there might still be churning). I therefore also include the following process in the estimation:
ˆ̀t = c`+ρ` ˆ̀t−1 +ρ∆∆`t−1 +u`,t (8)
where ∆`t = `t − ˆ̀t , and u`,t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2` .
6.1 Estimation
The main parameters to be estimated are α, τ+, and τ−. The targeted moments are:
1. The average establishment size in number of employees. Given adjustment costs, a higher α implies
high labor productivity and high labor demand.
8I had more success in matching data moments with this process. Modelling the processes of A and w independently could not
account for the high correlation between the two variables.
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2. The percentage of establishments which are inactive in a period. Given α, this fraction will be gov-
erned by the labor adjustment costs τ+ and τ−.
3. The percentage of establishments with positive adjustment among those establishments which are
active. This moment will balance the adjustment cost parameters. Given the fraction of adjusting
establishments, a higher fraction of expanding firms should result in a lower τ+ estimate relative to
τ−.
The parameters c`, ρ`, ρ∆ and σ` in equation 8 are estimated outside of the main estimation algorithm,
and are based on linear regressions conditional on different establishment sizes. I distinguish 40 size cate-
gories (thus estimating a total of 160 parameters), which is also the size of the discrete grid for employment.
The decision space is discretized into 27 points, including all adjustments between -12 and 12 employees
(which account for more than 99.5 % of all monthly adjustments) and also -41 (the average adjustment if
adjustment is less than -12) and +58 (the average adjustment if adjustment is greater than 12).
To estimate the main parameters, I start with an initial vector of parameter values. Based on α, I infer
lnAt of the establishments in my data (since sales and employment are observed), and estimate the parame-
ters in equations 6 and 7 through linear regression. The values for lnA and ln(A/w) are then discretized and
probability transition matrices estimated following the method in Tauchen (1986).
Next, the values and optimal choices associated with each point in the discrete space state are calculated
through value function iteration. Starting with a uniform distribution of employment `, productivity lnA,
and productivity-wages ln(A/w) across establishments, I use the decision rules and transition probabilities
to iterate on this distribution until convergence is achieved. This distribution and decision rules result in the
three simulated counterparts of the targeted moments. The Nelder-Mead algorithm is applied to minimize
the weighted sum of the difference between data and simulated moments. The weighting matrix is the
identity matrix. The targeted and simulated moments for each adjustment frequency are given in table 3.
It can be seen from the table that the percentage of inactive firms is higher for higher adjustment fre-
quencies. The estimator successfully matches the moments for monthly and quarterly adjustment frequency,
but has difficulties in matching the moments – especially the third one – at annual adjustment frequencies.
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Table 3: Data and simulated moments
(1) (2) (3)
Adjustment frequency Monthly Quarterly Annual
Target moment Average establishment size
Data 52.4 52.2 54.0
Simulated 52.4 53.6 55.1
Target moment Share inactive
Data 61.0 40.2 21.1
Simulated 60.9 40.1 21.6
Target moment Share hiring if active
Data 48.9 50.9 57.4
Simulated 48.6 50.4 53.2
Note: Average establishment size in number of workers. Share
inactive and share hiring if active in percentages.
7 Data
The data are linked employer-employee data from Germany (LIAB longitudinal model version 3), covering
the years 1993 to 2007. The data have a survey based employer side, and an administrative employee side.
The employer survey is conducted annually through in-place interviews. The sampling unit is an establish-
ment (in German Betrieb), not a firm as a legal entity. Roughly an establishment is a spatial and commercial
unit. A firm might thus have many establishments. The population are all establishments with at least
one employee subject to social security contributions. The sampling method is stratified random sampling,
with larger establishments (in terms of employment) being oversampled. The survey collects information
on annual sales, expenditures on intermediate inputs, employment, investment and many other areas. The
employee side of the data comes from the administrative records of the German Employment Agency. Ev-
ery employee subject to social security contributions must be reported by the employing establishment to
the Agency for the purpose of computing and collecting social security contributions. As such, the estab-
lishment must also report the exact salary paid to the employee. From this administrative data, I know the
beginning and the end date of employment spells of any employee employed by any of the establishments
surveyed by the establishment panel. More information on the data can be found in Jacobebbinghaus (2008).
The main advantage of this data is the accurate observance of all employment flows. This is what allows
me to use gross rather than net flows and what allows me to include the discrete option of simultaneous hiring
and separation (in addition to only hiring and only separation) to the choice set. In choosing my estimation
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Figure 1: Size distribution
sample I follow the following criteria (the detailed steps of the sample selection are in appendix B): I drop
establishments which exhibit large discrepancies in employment between the survey and the administrative
records; I choose a balanced panel over four years (1996 - 1999) to abstract from establishment entry and
exit, and I include only establishments of 300 or fewer employees to have a more homogeneous sample.
Exact definitions of hires, separations and employment are in the appendix.
Finally, I use a randomly selected 90% of the establishment for the estimation, leaving the remaining
10% for out-of-sample predictions. These choices are admittedly somewhat arbitrary. But one has to take
a stand regarding how to treat data inconsistencies, and what to count as a – potentially costly – hire and
separation. I also estimate the model where hires and separations are defined more loosely and where
different criteria are used to classify a separation as worker- or as establishment-initiated. I discuss this in
the results section. These steps leave me with 2,816 establishments. For monthly adjustment frequencies I
obtain 33,408 establishment-month observations (a few establishments have to be dropped if no employee or
no wage is reported for a month). The resulting sample is not representative of all German establishments.
But estimating “correct” adjustment costs per se is not the purpose of this paper. Instead I am interested in
the effect of different model specifications on adjustment cost estimates.
Figure 1 plots the size (in terms of employment) distribution of the establishments. Most establishments
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Figure 2: Net adjustment
are small with only a few employees, but the right tail is very long. The more interesting information is
shown in figure 2, which shows net labor adjustments for monthly and for annual frequencies. Note that the
scales for the two graphs are different. Within a month, about 60% of all establishment-month observations
do not change their employment stock (this masks some cases of hires and separations of equal quantity), and
almost no establishment has net changes of more than 5 employees. Contrast this with annual adjustments:
No adjustment occurs only in little more than 20% of all cases, and the tails are much fatter. There is nothing
surprising about this. But the implications for adjustment cost estimates are profound.
Finally, to give a first impression on the importance of distinguishing net from gross adjustments, in
table 4 I tabulate the frequencies of each discrete choice for both gross and net changes. We see that even
for monthly frequencies net adjustments “hide” many cases (16%) of simultaneous hiring and separations.
Importantly, the establishments are not as inactive as one might think observing only net adjustments (55.6%
instead of 61%). For annual adjustment, the difference between gross and net adjustment is dramatic. 75.3%
of establishments do hire and separate within a year.
7.1 Sales
A substantial problem is posed by the fact that the sales variable is taken from the establishment survey
and thus only available as an annual variable. All other relevant variables (hires, separations, wage, and
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Table 4: Net vs. gross adjustments (percentage of observations)
Month Year
Net Gross Net Gross
Only hire (H) 19.2 13.2 44.6 7.7
Only separation (F) 19.8 15.2 33.6 6.8
No hire, no separation (P) 61.0 55.6 21.8 10.2
Both hire and separation (B) n.a. 15.9 n.a. 75.3
Total 100 100 100 100
employment) can be constructed for any day, but I can not know the revenues for any time interval other
than a calendar year. Since I will estimate my model using monthly, quarterly, and annual frequencies, I
have to decide how the reported annual sales should be divided unto months and quarters. I follow two
approaches. The first is to assume that sales were evenly distributed for the year (even). The second is to
assume that sales over months and quarters add up to the annual sales number reported by the establishment,
that they are never negative, but that changes from period to period are smooth (smooth). In particular,
taking for example monthly sales, I construct sales to solve the following problem:
min
{st}Tt=1
J =
T
∑
t=2
(st − st−1)2 s.t.
12
∑
t=1
st = S1
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∑
t=13
st = S2
...
st ≥ 0 ∀t
where S are the reported annual sales. Figure 3 depicts the two sales series for an establishment. Of
course both series are “wrong”. They contain both classical measurement error due to the establishment
probably reporting only a rounded or an approximate sales number, as well as error due to wrongly allocating
the annual sales to months and quarters. Moreover, in both of the series there will almost certainly be
autocorrelation in the measurement error. But recall that in the estimation the individual sales data are not
actually used. Rather, the average (over time and establishments) sales conditional on the state and the
discrete choice are used, that is E(St |xot ,dt), so that the errors in the individual sales data should to some
extent cancel out. All sales data are net sales, that is revenue minus expenditures on intermediate inputs. This
measurement error also explains the reason for the parameter σs in equation θ̃. Remember that I estimate
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Figure 3: Annual sales divided to months, even and smooth
expected sales E(St |xot ). Suppose the measurement error ζt is independent and identically distributed, and
that measured sales S̃ relate to true sales S as St = ζt S̃t . Then E(St |xot ) = E(ζt S̃t |xot ). If the covariance
between ζt and S̃t is zero, then we have E(St |xot ) = E(ζt S̃t |xot ) = E(ζt)E(S̃t |xot ). Thus, E(ζt) is 1/σs in θ̃.
7.2 Capital
The literature on factor adjustment costs has mostly assumed that adjustment of all other factors is costless,
and the present paper is no exception. Asphjell et al. (2014) and Bloom (2009) are exceptions to this
simplification and their results suggest that neglecting capital adjustment costs might seriously bias labor
adjustment cost estimates. The reason for why this bias would occur is very intuitive. If capital and labor
are interdependent, either as substitutes or complements, adjustments of the two factors are likely to be
simultaneous. Thus, costs of investing might easily be attributed to labor adjustment. A model including
capital adjustment costs would need to include the capital stock as a state variable. The establishment survey
includes the value of annual investments (the same difficulty in allocating this annual figure to months
and quarters as we saw for sales would apply). Establishments are also asked what percentage of their
investments have been used to replace depreciated capital. With external information on depreciation rates
(for example industry-wide) an estimate of the capital stock can be constructed. I constructed capital in
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this way using depreciation rate information from the German Statistical Office, but the thus constructed
variable exhibited within-establishment variations which I judged to be not credible (an AR(1) regression
of capital produced an R2 of 0.05). Furthermore, using this variable would expand the state space from
three to four variables, thus diminishing cell sizes for the nearest-neighbor estimates outlined above and
multiplying estimation times by at least one order of magnitude. All these considerations have led me to not
include capital as a separate variable. However, as a “quick and dirty” alternative I have estimated the model
with eight instead of four discrete choices, where each original discrete choice is split into with investment
and no investment, and investment incurs a fixed cost. The choice is with investment if in the observed
calendar year the establishment reported investment of at least 1,000 euros and no investment else. By doing
this, I intend to capture some of the contamination that might accrue due to simultaneous capital and labor
adjustments. This exercise is just intended as an exploration and I make no claim here that this approach
solves the problem of interrelated factor demand.
7.3 Hours
The data distinguish between part- and full-time employment. A more detailed variable on hours worked is
not available, and I do not use the part- vs. full-time information. Intuitively, the true adjustment costs will
be lower than the ones I estimate. We know that establishments can respond to changing circumstances by
changing the average hours worked or by changing the number (and/or composition) of employees. We are
not observing the instances in which average hours are adjusted. Presumably, if we were able to close the
hours adjustment channel (as in my model), we would see more adjustment through hirings and separations
in the data. That is, adjustment through number of employees is less inflexible than it appears in my final
sample, because establishments can respond to changing circumstances through both channels, of which I
observe only one. Without hours adjustment the establishment would be more active in terms of hiring and
separations and estimation would yield lower adjustment costs.
8 Results
The parameter vector to be estimated is θ̃z = (1/(σsσ) −1/σ − τ+/σ − τ−/σ), where 1/σs is the
measurement error in sales, σ is the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution, and τ+ and τ− are the
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Table 5: Estimated parameters and costs
Discrete choices Three Four Eight
Sales variable Even Smooth Even Smooth Smooth Smooth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measurement error sales 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.20 0.35
Scale parameter 200 204 166 158 227 148
Adjustment Costs in 1,000 Euros
Hiring cost (τ+) 73 69 39 34 -48 35
Separation cost (τ−) 100 98 40 36 -74 36
Fixed cost (τ f ) 445
Investment cost (τi) 1942
Note: Even refers to annual sales divided evenly unto the months of the year. Smooth refers to annual
sales divided unto the months according to the method described in section 7.1. The model with eight
discrete choices includes capital adjustment. Each labor adjustment is divided up into with and without
capital investment.
labor adjustment costs. It also includes−τ f /σ if I include a fixed cost of adjustment which is incurred in any
period in which hiring or separations take place, or−τi/σ if I include a fixed cost of investment as described
in the capital section. The main results for monthly adjustment frequencies are presented in table 5. The
first two columns are results for models where hiring and separation costs are incurred on net changes. If
an establishment had more hirings than separations I considered its choice to be H, in the reverse case F ,
and if the two variables were equal the choice is P. The choice B – simultaneous hiring and separations –
does not exist in this model. By necessity this would be the model when employment is available only as
a stock variable, or if labor is treated as homogeneous, in which case the choice B would be economically
non-sensible if adjustment is costly. The first column divides annual sales evenly across the months of the
year, and the second shows results where sales have been smoothed according to the procedure described in
section 7.1.
Qualitatively most results are in line with expectations. The sales measurement error and the scale
parameter of the error term are positive, and both hiring and separations are costly. Where the model with
net adjustment fails is in delivering adjustment costs in a realistic range. Even though I don’t have any
priors about these costs,9 hiring costs of 73,000 Euros per hire and separation costs of 100,000 Euros per
separation seem much too high.10
9The only estimated hiring costs for German establishments are from Mühlemann and Pfeifer (2013) and lie between 4,000 and
6,000 Euros. Harhoff and Kane (1997) report training costs of new apprentices between $5,000 and $10,000.
10Both median and mean annual earnings in the data are around 19,000 Euros. The mean is not greater because information on
high wages is censored.
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Columns three and four add the fourth option B to the model. This decreases the frequency of P choices
in the data, since in the 3-choice model some cases in which both hirings and separations occur would
have been classified as P. In line with the intuition given in the identification section, fewer inactive periods
should decrease the cost parameters, and this is indeed what we observe. The cost parameters in the 4-choice
model are 50 to 65 percent smaller than in the 3-choice model. The estimated costs translate to 170 to 180%
of the average annual wage of workers. This is a high estimate in comparison to the literature. However,
one should keep in mind that the absence of information on hours worked probably overestimates the costs
(see the discussion in section 7.3), and that the German labor market is more regulated than the American
one.
Hiring and separations seem equally costly, while in the 3-choice model separations are 30% more
costly than hirings. This result demonstrates that the distinction between net and gross adjustments is very
important for the estimated costs. An interesting result is the relative insensitivity of estimates to which sales
measure I use. This is because individual measurement errors due to dividing annual sales largely cancel
each other out – irrespective of how the division is carried out – when creating average sales conditional on
the state and the discrete choice.
Column 5 adds a fixed – and symmetric – adjustment cost to the model. Unfortunately this model does
not work well. The fixed cost of adjustment is extremely high, and every additional hire or separation actu-
ally reduces this cost.11 Finally, the sixth column shows results from a model where the investment choice
has been added to the choice set, creating eight discrete choices as described in section 7.2. While invest-
ment clearly is an important cost factor, it is surprising that the remaining parameters are only negligibly
affected. The adjustment costs are virtually equal to the result of column 4. As mentioned earlier, this
last specification is misspecified since capital is not included as a state variable, but the result suggests that
investment is orthogonal to the remaining variables of this model.
Table 6 presents results for different assumptions on the frequency of hiring and separation decisions.
All dynamic discrete choice models are estimated with four discrete choices, while the method of simulated
moments results are based on net adjustment. The first column in the upper panel echoes the result in column
4 of table 5. The second column shows results from the model where decisions are made at the beginning of
each quarter, and the third column shows results from annual adjustments. Since sales are reported in annual
11All models with fixed adjustment costs have exhibited this result, so I do not pursue this specification any further.
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Table 6: Different choice frequencies and estimation methods
Decision frequency Monthly Quarterly Annual Monthly aggregated
Data frequency Monthly Quarterly Annual Quarterly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dynamic Discrete Choice
Scale parameter σ 158 2151 -906
−Hiring cost / σ -0.21 0.07 0.12
−Separation cost / σ -0.23 0.11 0.21
Hiring cost 34 -149 113
Separation cost 36 -243 190
Method of Simulated Moments
Hiring cost 1.5 0.1 -10.9 1.7
Separation cost -0.5 1.0 16.1 -0.4
Note: All cost estimates in 1,000s of Euros. Sales are smoothed over the periods. The parameter α for
the method of simulated moments is estimated to be around 0.5 for all three specifications. Decision fre-
quency refers to how frequently establishment revises its employment, data frequency refers to moments
that are being matched, see also table 3. The last column pertains to a monthly model which is aggregated
to quarterly data.
frequency, this variable can be taken as it is reported. The final column is only relevant for the alternative
model. The model is based on establishments making monthly decisions. These decisions are aggregated to
quarterly observations and matched to moments at a quarterly frequency, as inCooper et al. (2007).
In table 6 I have also included the raw estimates of the parameters −τ+/σ and −τ−/σ. We see that
they are increasing in the length of the chosen time period. This is in line with the intuition given in the
identification section 5.1. Only the monthly model gives estimates which do not result in the rejection of
the model in any dimension. For quarterly data, the finding is one of negative adjustment costs. For annual
data, the scale parameter is estimated to be negative. Since this parameter should be strictly positive, the
annual adjustment model must be mis-specified in some respect: it might be in assuming that adjustments
take place annually, but it might as well be in different respects.
The cost estimates for the alternative model are much smaller and more in line with the estimates ob-
tained by a similar methodology in the literature. The monthly and quarterly models match the target mo-
ments closely, while the annual model does not match well the share of hiring establishments among active
establishments (table3). What is apparent from the estimates is the sensitivity of the estimates to the sec-
ond and third data moments (share of inactive establishments and share of hiring establishments among the
active ones): Since the share of hiring establishments among the active ones is decreasing in the modelled
adjustment frequency (separations are more lumpy than hirings), the costs of hiring relative to separations
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are also increasing in adjustment frequency. For example, the quarterly model (column 2) has lower hiring
and higher separation costs than the monthly model (column 1), so as to accommodate a higher share of
hiring firms.
Conditional on adjustment, the estimated cost parameters imply that the cost per adjustment is higher
for lower adjustment frequencies (from 0.48 for monthly to 0.60 for annual adjustments). This contradicts
the observation of a higher share of inactive establishments at high frequencies. However, the lower share of
inactive establishments at low frequencies can easily be explained by the larger marginal profits that would
be implied by a longer time horizon. One interesting observation is that a model with monthly adjustment
frequency and monthly data can be reproduced if the data is available only quarterly by aggregating up
the choices from the monthly model (column 4). The cost estimates of this aggregated model are in the
ballpark of the model matched on monthly data. Still, this does not answer the question at which frequency
employment decisions are made or best approximated, and the separation cost parameter for the monthly
model carries a negative sign. This could be due to sampling error, but the monthly and quarterly estimates
lie well below the figures reported in Mühlemann and Pfeifer (2013) and Harhoff and Kane (1997).
The sensitivity of cost estimates to time aggregation is not an entirely new observation (see for exam-
pleBloom (2009)), and not an encouraging finding for the field. It would imply that knowledge of the exact
decision making process of managers and establishments must precede any attempt to estimate adjustment
costs. This must also be acknowledged as a limitation of this paper: it cannot answer the question which
adjustment frequency should be assumed.
Consider next in table 7 how results respond to changes in the model assumptions or sample selection.
All results are for monthly adjustment freqencies. Since the two sales variables yield very similar results, I
only report results for the smoothed sales variable. I first compare the benchmark model (table 5, column 4)
to models with lower discount factors, one with an annual discount factor β of 0.5 (column 2), and one with
β = 0 (column 3), making this a static model, e.g. the firm is not forward looking. Since future sales and
wages are discounted, the values associated with labor adjustment are deflated. Naturally, labor adjustment
is estimated to be less costly.
Next, I estimate the model defining a separation to be worker-initiated (and therefore costless) if the
separation is not followed by another spell within 4 (column 4) or 8 (column 5) weeks, OR if the next ob-
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served spell is within 4 or 8 weeks, and this spell is an employment spell. The idea is that an employment
spell which soon after its end is followed by another employment spell is a job-to-job transition, and an
employment spell followed by neither employment nor unemployment is an out-of-labor-force transition.
Thus, only separations which end in unemployment within 4 (8) weeks are considered to be establishment
initiated. This results in higher adjustment costs, since this definition of establishment-initiated separations
increases the inactive periods of the establishment. Since the inactivity is mostly on the separation dimen-
sion, separation cost estimates increase much more than hiring cost estimates.
Column 6 shows results from a model where the length of the employment vector is increased from 40
to 50, that is the employment discretization is finer. It is re-assuring that this hardly affects the estimates.
Column 7 shows results from a sample of establishments with at most 100 employees (compared to 300 in
the benchmark model). This gives an indication about the effect of aggregation in the firm size. Smaller
firms will adjust less frequently, and the cost parameters should be greater in magnitude. This is what we
observe in column 7. Finally, I allowed the adjustment costs to be dependent on the log of the median wage
paid in the establishment by including the interaction terms E(ht |xot ,dt ∈ {H,B})∗ log(w̄) and E( ft |xot ,dt ∈
{F,B}) ∗ log(w̄) into the z(xot ,dt) vector. The results in column 8 suggest that if average wages in the
establishment are higher, adjustment costs are lower, e.g. a 10% increase in wages decreases hiring costs by
0.29*0.1 = 0.029 thousand (29) Euros, and decreases separation costs by 24 Euros. Establishments which
pay higher wages could have lower adjustment costs. Alternatively, establishments which pay higher wages
are larger, so that they might be benefiting from economies of scale. Or the estimate for larger establishments
understates their true adjustment costs because of aggregation issues discussed in the literature section.
9 Performance
I now turn to an issue which in my opinion in the framework of structural models has remained somewhat
unsatisfactory. How can we evaluate/validate a structural model? And against which benchmark? An ideal
setting would be to estimate a structural model for a certain time period, and use the estimated model to
predict outcomes for another time period in which one of the structural parameters is changed (I will call
this “treatment” in line with the treatment effect and evaluation literature). This is the route followed by
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014). That would be informative about the usefulness of the model.
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A well-designed, reduced form policy evaluation would give us a credible treatment estimate. Since the
unique purpose of the latter is to quantify the treatment effect, the structural modeller could not hope to
outperform the reduced form estimate with the predictions of the structural model. Comparing structural
models with reduced-form policy evaluations in this way seems misguided, since the purpose of structural
models is not primarily, or even if it is, not uniquely, to evaluate a particular treatment. Be that as it may, the
present paper does not have a structural change to evaluate.
A sensible evaluation would be based on comparing the goodness of fit (e.g. the Pseudo R-squared based
on the likelihood function) and the fraction of correctly predicted outcomes between the structural model and
a naive reduced form model. This can be done for the estimation sample, or for out-of-sample observations.
What should the naive model be? If I had estimated the structural model based on three outcomes (that is
net hiring, net inactivity, and net separations), my model should at least outperform a simple ordinal choice
model such as ordinal logit with sales, average wages, and the employment stock (the same state variables
as in the structural model) as explanatory variables. But one of the strengths of the present paper is precisely
having the fourth choice of both hiring and separations simultaneously, and the four choices do not have
a natural ordering. Thus, the best comparison I can make is with respect to a multinomial logit model
consisting of the aforementioned four choices, and using the same z(xot ,dt) as in the full dynamic model to
characterise the choices, but disregarding the dynamic aspect. The test is therefore about whether modelling
this problem as a dynamic discrete choice model improves on treating it as static. I present two performance
measures: the pseudo R2 defined as 1−LLu/LLr, where LLu is the log-likelihood of the model and LLr is
the log-likelihood of assigning a probability of 25% to each choice; and the fraction of correctly predicted
outcomes, where a correct prediction is defined as the observed choice having a higher probability of being
chosen than all alternatives. These two measures are calculated for 1) the non-parametric, initial choice
probabilities described in the estimation section, 2) the dynamic model, 3) the static model. All measures
are calculated for a randomly selected 10% of the original sample which were excluded from the estimation
sample.
Table 8 shows the performance measures for these three models. As expected, the non-parametric
estimates outperform the parametric predictions. The parametric models are based on four parameters, the
non-parametric model separately calculates choice probabilities for 12,000 points in the state space. It serves
here as an ideal benchmark. The interesting comparison is between the dynamic and the static model. The
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Table 8: Out of sample performance
(1) (2)
Pseudo R2 Fraction predicted
Non-parametric 0.286 62.6
Dynamic Model 0.070 60.1
Static Model (β = 0) 0.070 58.9
pseudo R2 of the dynamic and the static model are equal. The dynamic model does a bit better in predicting
the correct discrete choice. The difference in the fraction predicted between the dynamic and static model
is significant at 7% if it is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the fraction in the dynamic model
is higher. Accounting for the dynamic aspects of an establishment adds little to the model performance in
terms of out-of-sample predictions despite having very different estimated adjustment costs – a phenomenon
that relates to the poor identification of the discount parameter in these types of models (see Abbring and
Daljord (2016) for a treatment of this). The performances are similar because both models fit the data using
the same choice and the same state variables. But the estimates are very different because the differences
between the values of the different choices are much greater in the dynamic model than in the static model,
since the former is composed of the entire expected future stream of profits associated with a choice. This
opens up an interesting question of model selection regarding the dynamic aspects of dynamic discrete
choice models.
10 Discussion and conclusion
I have analysed labor adjustment costs using a structural dynamic discrete choice model of establishments’
hiring and separation decisions. I did this using linked employer-employee data from Germany which
allowed me to observe all the in- and out-flows of employees in an establishment, and thus to distinguish
net from gross flows. My objective was to analyse which model specifications – in terms of temporal
aggregation and net vs. gross adjustments – yield cost estimates in accordance with economic intuition.
Using monthly choice frequencies, the signs of the four parameters are in line with economic intuition
and with model assumptions. Hirings and separations are costly, the scale parameter of the extreme value
distribution is positive, sales are profitable, and paying wages is unprofitable (ceteris paribus). One of the
main objectives of the paper was to show that the timing assumptions, that is the assumed frequency of
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revising hirings and separations, should matter for the estimated costs, and I have demonstrated that they
indeed matter a great deal. The change in the parameters in moving from monthly to less frequent choice
frequencies changed the cost parameters in line with my predictions. Indeed, the estimation results clearly
rejected quarterly and annual adjustment frequencies.
I also showed that results can vary widely between different estimation strategies. This is clear from the
results observed in the literature as well as from a comparison of my benchmark model with the alternative
model. However, temporal aggregation is also important in the alternative model.
Another main objective was to highlight the importance between gross and net changes. Again, in line
with predictions, I showed that adding the choice of simultaneous hiring and separations result in smaller
adjustment costs – the reduction is more than 50%. I also investigated a number of other specifications and
sample restrictions and found that adjustment costs are estimated to be higher for smaller establishments,
and that a wider definition of worker-initiated separations increases the cost parameters. All these results
work through the channel of how much activity is observed. Shorter choice frequencies, classifying fewer
separations as establishment initiated, using smaller establishments, and using only net adjustments all result
in higher adjustment costs. This is intuitive. Economic conditions change all the time. If firms do not
respond frequently by adjusting employment it must be costly to do so. In that sense the present analysis
has been very instructive.
However, the dynamic model has barely outperformed a static one but has resulted in very different
adjustment cost quantities (e.g. a separation costs 2,000 Euros in the static, and around 35,000 Euros in the
dynamic model). Given the similar performances of the static and dynamic model and the very different cost
estimates, an open question is how one could discriminate between the two models to reject one in favour
of the other.
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Addison, John T, Pedro Portugal, and José Varejão (2014), “Labor demand research: Toward a better match
between better theory and better data.” Labour Economics, 30, 4–11.
Addison, John T, Claus Schnabel, and Joachim Wagner (2001), “Works councils in Germany: Their effects
on establishment performance.” Oxford Economic Papers, 53, 659–694.
Aguirregabiria, Victor (1997), “Estimation of dynamic programming models with censored dependent vari-
ables.” Investigaciones Economicas, 21, 167–208.
Aguirregabiria, Victor (1999), “The dynamics of markups and inventories in retailing firms.” Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 275–308.
Aguirregabiria, Victor and Cesar Alonso-Borrego (2014), “Labor contracts and flexibility: Evidence from a
labor market reform in Spain.” Economic Inquiry, 52, 930–957.
Aguirregabiria, Victor and Pedro Mira (2002), “Swapping the nested fixed point algorithm: A class of
estimators for discrete Markov decision models.” Econometrica, 70, 1519–1543.
Asphjell, Magne K, Wilko Letterie, Øivind A Nilsen, and Gerard A Pfann (2014), “Sequentiality versus
simultaneity: Interrelated factor demand.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 96, 986–998.
Bachmann, Ronald (2005), “Labour market dynamics in Germany: Hirings, separations, and job-to-job
transitions over the business cycle.” SFB 649 Discussion Paper.
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Appendix A - Deriving the likelihood probabilities
The choice-specific value function is given by the current profits of the choice net of adjustment costs and
the expected value of next period’s value, conditional on the current state and choice.
v(xot ,dt) = z(x
o
t ,dt)θ
′
z +u
d
t +βExot+1,ut+1
(
V (xot+1,ut+1)|xot ,dt
)
where u = (uH uP uF uB). I can rewrite this as
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I can separately characterize the parts containing z and u. For z:
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])
θ
′
z
For u:
∞
∑
i=1
β
iExot+i,ut+i
(
ud
∗
t+i |xot ,dt
)
∞
∑
i=1
β
iExot+i|xot ,dt
[
∑
dt+i∈D
P(d∗t+i = dt+i|xot+i)E
(
udt+i |xot+i,d∗t+i = dt+i
)]
(10)
The expression E
(
udt+i |xot+i,d∗t+i = dt+i
)
is the expected value of the shock to choice dt+i given that this
choice dominated all alternatives. The important insight of Hotz and Miller (1993) is to show that this can
be expressed as a function of the choice probabilities. In the case of the type I extreme value distribution,
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this expectation is given by12
µ+σ(γ− lnP(dt |xt))≡ e(xot ,dt)θ′e
with e(xot ,dt) = (1 γ− lnP(dt |xot )), θe = (µ σ), and γ is Euler’s constant. The parameters of the distri-
bution (µ and σ) are usually not identified and set to 0 and 1 respectively. Replacing this in equation 10 I
get
∞
∑
i=1
β
iExot+i|xot ,dt
[
∑
dt+i∈D
P(d∗t+i = dt+i|xot+i)e(xot ,dt)θ′e
]
×
(
∞
∑
i=1
β
iExot+i|xot ,dt
[
∑
dt+i∈D
P(d∗t+i = dt+i|xot+i)e(xot ,dt)
])
θ
′
e
Define
z̃(xot ,dt) =z(x
o
t ,dt)+β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)z(xot+1,dt+1)
)
+
β
2
∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)
[
∑
xot+2
F(xot+2|xot+1,dt+1)
{
∑
dt+2∈D
P(dt+2|xot+2)z(xot+2,dt+2)
}])
+ · · ·
Then
z̃(xot ,dt) =z(x
o
t ,dt)+β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)[
z(xot+1,dt+1)+
∞
∑
k=1
β
kExot+1+k|xot+1,dt+1
{
∑
dt+1+k∈D
P(dt+1+k|xot+1+k)z(xot+1+k,dt+1+k)
}])
=z(xot ,dt)+β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)z̃(xot+1,dt+1)
)
where the last equation follows from
z̃(xot ,dt) = z(x
o
t ,dt)+
∞
∑
j=1
β
jExot+ j|xot ,dt
(
∑
dt+ j∈D
P(dt+ j|xot+ j)z(xot+ j,dt+ j)
)
12I am greatly thankful to Aureo de Paula for providing me with a reference with the proof of this.
43
Similarly let
ẽ(xot ,dt) =β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)e(xot+1,dt+1)
)
+
β
2
∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)
[
∑
xot+2
F(xt+2|xot+1,dt+1)
{
∑
dt+2∈D
P(dt+2|xot+2)e(xot+2,dt+2)
}])
+ · · ·
Then
ẽ(xot ,dt) =β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)[
e(xot+1,dt+1)+
∞
∑
k=1
β
kExot+1+k|xot+1,dt+1
{
∑
dt+1+k∈D
P(dt+1+k|xot+1+k)e(xot+1+k,dt+1+k)
}])
=β ∑
xot+1
F(xot+1|xot ,dt)
(
∑
dt+1∈D
P(dt+1|xot+1)
{
e(xot+1,dt+1)+ ẽ(x
o
t+1,dt+1)
})
where the last equation follows from
ẽ(xot ,dt) =
∞
∑
j=1
β
jExot+ j|xot ,dt
(
∑
dt+ j∈D
P(dt+ j|xot+ j)e(xot+ j,dt+ j)
)
I rewrite equation 9 as
v(xot ,dt) = z̃(x
o
t ,dt)θ
′
z + ẽ(x
o
t ,dt)θ
′
e
where
Now define
Wz(xo) = ∑
d∈D
P(d|xo)z̃(xo,d)
We(xo) = ∑
d∈D
P(d|xo)(e(xo,d)+ ẽ(xo,d))
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so that
z̃(xo,d) = z(xo,d)+β∑
xo′
f (xo
′ |xo,d)Wz(xo
′
)
ẽ(xo,d) = β∑
xo
f (xo
′ |xo,d)We(xo
′
)
where xo′ denotes the state vector in the following period. Writing W(xo) ≡ [Wz(xo)We(xo)], W(xo)∗ is
the unique solution to the recursive equation
W(xo) = ∑
d∈D
P(d|xo)×
(
[z(xo,d),e(xo,d)]+βF(xo
′ |xo,d)W (xo′)
)
(11)
The choice probability of alternative d is given by
P(d|xo) = exp(v(x
o
t ,d)/σ
∑ j=D exp(v(xot , j)/sigma
where σ is the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution. Taking into account the measurement error
in sales as described in section 7.1, results in the parameter vectors θ̃z = (1/(σsσ) −1/σ − τ+/σ −
τ−/σ) and θ̃e = (µ/σ 1). Since the parameter µ/σ is multiplied by a constant, it is not identified.
Appendix B - Data cleaning and sample selection
I apply the following sample selection criteria and definitions:
1. The establishment survey reports the stock of employees paying social security for the 30th of June.
I compare this reported number to the stock of social security paying employees on the same day
from the administrative records. Ideally both numbers should be the same. I drop establishment-year
observations where the discrepancy is too large.13 I also drop establishment-years which report a
share of social security paying employees among all employees greater than 100%. Finally I drop
establishment-years for which this share is 50% or less and Emin ≥ 3.
2. To avoid the additional complication of establishment entry and exit, I use a balanced panel. To have
a balanced panel, I face a trade-off between the wide and the longitudinal dimension of the panel. A
13Let Emax be the greater of the two employment records, and Emin the smaller, and let ∆ ≡ Emax/Emin. Any observation with
∆≥ 2 is dropped. In addition, I drop observations if ∆≥ 1.66 and Emax ≥ 20, and if ∆≥ 1.5 and Emax ≥ 50.
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balanced panel for the entire sample period would leave me with too few establishment observations.
I pick a panel length of four years, and then select the four consecutive years for which I would have
the maximal number of uninterrupted establishment-year observations.
3. I drop establishments which have more than 300 employees in any of the survey years, thus dropping
17% of the remaining establishments. This reduces the representativeness of the sample but also its
size heterogeneity (the maximum number of employees in this sample exceeds 20,000). Presumably
the excluded establishments (a long right tail) might have very different adjustment costs.
4. Even though I observe the wage paid to every individual employee, the total wage bill at time t is
E(wt)lt . Instead of the mean wage I use the median due to some issues of right-censoring (due to caps
to the social security contributions). The mean wage (with censoring) in the sample is 1,620 Euros
and the median wage is 1,580 Euros.
5. I define a hire h in period t as an employment spell which starts between the first and last day of the
period, and if the employee has not been employed by the establishment at any point in the previous
366 days.14 If the employee has been employed in the establishment in the previous 366 days, I treat
him as a recalled employee and implicitly assume that this is done without incurring hiring costs. The
recalled worker will still be counted in the employment stock.
6. I define a separation f in period t as an employment spell terminating between the last day of period
t− 1 (e.g. the last day of work is the last day of the finished month) and the day before the last day
of t, and if the employee is not “recalled” within the next 366 days, and if the separation is not from
a worker aged 60 or older who does not start a new employment spell subsequently. With this last
condition I intend to capture retirements, which I also assume do not cause any separation costs.
7. I define employment at time t to be the number of social security paying employees on the last day of
period t.
14I also estimate the model with a different set of hiring and separation classifications. See results section.
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